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 Abstract 
This study investigates whether the income is equalising across the Chinese 
regions. This is done by answering the research question do the Chinese regions 
show any signs of convergence in gross regional product (GRP). Regressions 
have been done using the OLS-method to find correlation between initial GRP 
and the growth rate in GRP. This has been done for four time periods: 1952-2007, 
1952-78, 1978-99 and 1999-2007. Three geographic areas have been investigated: 
China, western China and eastern China. The time distinctions are based on 
political reforms and policies that have had different regional impact. The policies 
have benefitted different geographical areas, hence the geographic distinctions.  
The results show weak signs of convergence. But the lack of convergence can be 
interpreted as China being a transitional economy. The calculations indicate that 
all the Chinese regions are moving towards a higher income level and that all 
regions are getting richer. Nonetheless, the eastern regions that have experienced 
preferential treatment have started growing at an earlier stage, and thus is growing 
faster than the western. 
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 1  Introduction 
 
 
”If the rich become richer and the poor become poorer, there would occur polarization that is 
exactly what a socialist system should and can avoid” 
- Deng Xiaoping 19921  
Since the late 1970’s, China’s economy has had an average GDP growth rate of 10 percent 
per year. Today, it is the third largest economy in the world, after USA and Japan, and the 
second largest trading nation, after Germany (Ljunggren, 2008:43). Few people doubt that 
China in a few decades will be the largest economy in the world – but possibly far from the 
most developed. The remarkable speed of growth has put China in a complex process of 
modernization in which the Chinese people experience increasing welfare (and urbanization) 
while they collaterally are struggling with great inequality. Today the richest region, 
Shanghai, is about 10 times richer than the poorest region, Guizhou. Generally, the eastern 
provinces are the more developed ones while the western provinces have not grown as 
quickly. Inequality, through a variety of political, social and economic reasons, impedes the 
prospect of future growth (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). Measures have been taken to decrease 
the gap within the country and as the quote by the initiator of the reforms that lead to the 
growth seen today, Deng Xiaoping (the former premier of China), states: a socialist society 
should strive towards equality and increased standard of living for all. The ideological 
direction of Chinese politics in combination with the concentration of growth policies to 
certain areas causes a lot of curiosity, and questions arise: is China on the right path towards 
equalising income across the nation? Was equality greater during the command economy than 
during the present socialist market economy? What effects have the changes of political 
agendas had on growth? And where is the Chinese economy heading? These are just a few of 
the questions arising when considering the Chinese economy’s development, and these are the 
questions that have inspired this study and will be answered by the overall research question. 
Inequality in China will be analysed from a regional perspective from the 1950’s to the 
present to try to determine if there are any evidence of Deng Xiaoping’s vision to avoid the 
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 rich from becoming richer while the poor become poorer, but instead make the whole Chinese 
economy blossom. 
1.1  Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this essay is to investigate the development of the Chinese regions income 
levels in relation to each other and to the political policies. This will be investigated from a 
growth perspective to see if the poorer regions tend to catch up with the richer ones. The 
overall research question is thus:  
Do the Chinese regions show any signs of convergence in Gross Regional Product? 
Answering this question will show how the patterns of inequality in China have changed over 
time and might give a hint on how future growth policies should be designed.  
1.2  Research Description 
The purpose of this essay is not to investigate the factors behind China’s growth but to 
determine if there is any evidence of convergence between the Chinese regions. We will 
check for absolute convergence of the regions Gross Regional Products (GRP), conditional 
convergence of the GRP moving towards the regions steady state GRP level, and convergence 
among the regions steady state GRP level.  
A time period of 55 years (1952-2007) will be looked at. In order to get more comprehensive 
results we have additionally decided to look at the growth rates during three shorter periods: 
1952-78, 1978-99 and 1999-2007. These periods are based on major political reforms, as 
China has gone from a socialist command economy to a partially open economy to a socialist 
market economy. Based on previous studies (Kanbur and Zhang 2005), political decisions 
have played an important role for the Chinese economic growth, and especially the 
differences in regional growth due to different policies in the eastern and western parts, we 
have decided to analyse convergence across the whole nation, but also across the western 
respectively the eastern parts to find out if there is any difference in the result when the two 
areas are treated as separate economies. The different policies affecting growth will be further 
explained in chapter 3 where a brief historical background is given. The following part 
(1.2.1.) will give an introduction to the Chinese regions and which regions are included in this 
study. 
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 1.2.1. The Chinese Regions 
Today China consists of 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities and 2 special 
administrative regions (Kjellgren 2000: 27). In this study the mainland provinces of China 
will be considered (except for Tibet that due to its unstable political situation does not have 
enough data to show reliable results). The provinces not considered, except for Tibet, are the 
two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau, and the island of Taiwan. These 
exceptions have been made since their connections to mainland China have been somewhat 
unclear and changing during the time-span looked at, hence they are not of interest for this 
study where political decisions affecting growth will be studied.  
Other exceptions are the two provinces of Chongqing and Hainan. Both of these regions have 
reached provincial status during the time period covered by this study; Chongqing became 
independent from Sichuan in 1997 and Hainan from Guangdong in 1988 (Naughton 2007: 
22). There is not enough available data for these provinces previous to them reaching regional 
status to draw conclusions on the behaviour of these provinces as independent regions, thus 
Chongqing and Hainan have throughout the study been included in the provinces they 
originally belonged to. 
As mentioned above, the Chinese regions are assumed to have been affected differently by the 
growth policies. By using the distinction made by the Chinese Government certain regions 
will be referred to as belonging to eastern respectively western China. This distinction was 
established in 1999 to determine which regions that had been neglected during the reform era 
and that were meant to benefit from the 1999 policy to increase western growth (Goodman 
2004).  
Figure 1 shows the Chinese regions and the border between the eastern and western 
provinces. To illustrate the differences in GRP-levels between eastern and western China 
diagrams 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 have been included for 1952, 1978, 1999 and 2007.  
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 1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
The study will be organised as follows: Chapter 2 gives a presentation of previous studies 
made on the subject of convergence. It will also give a general description of the method used 
and the data the study is based on. 
Chapter 3 presents a brief overview of the historical context of the period investigated. The 
political policies during the 55-year period are presented and will be further discussed in the 
analysis part in relation to the results. 
In chapter 4 the theoretical framework of the analysis is presented. The results are then 
presented in chapter 5, followed by an analysis in chapter 6 and finally a conclusion in 
chapter 7. 
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 2. Method and Material 
This chapter will give an introduction to previous studies on convergence and further explain 
how we intend to contribute to the field. A description of the choice of method used and the 
presentation of the data used will be presented. 
 
2.1. Previous Studies about Convergence 
The theory of convergence has been empirically tested between countries, but also across 
regions within countries. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991:154) convergence is 
more likely to occur between regions than countries, since the regions share similar 
characteristics.  
The inspiration for the research question comes from the research that Barro and Sala-i-
Martin have done regarding convergence across the US states, the Japanese prefectures and 
regions within France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin1992: 28).  These studies have shown that absolute convergence can 
be seen across regions and that the rate of convergence is about 2% per year, which means 
that it would take approximately 35 years for the regions to converge by 50%. In these cases 
the authors have also found evidence of conditional convergence where the regions tend to 
converge at similar rates (Barro, Sala-i-Martin 1991:153). The same study also found that, 
theoretically, a greater degree of labour mobility, could lead to a higher rate of convergence.  
There are major differences in income levels between the Chinese regions and several studies 
have been made to investigate the inequalities. Ljunggren (2008:112) states that the 
disparities in China are dependent on the reforms that were initiated in the late 1970’s, that 
showed a strong bias towards development of the eastern regions. According to Ljunggren the 
income gaps in China has increased since then. Kim and Knaap (2001) have looked at the 
issue and claim that disparities existed before the reform and still did in 2001. Yan, referred to 
by Ge and Wang (2003), believes that the income gap has decreased since the 1978 reform. In 
this article, Ge and Wang considered absolute and conditional convergence between the 
regions in China where they divided China into three smaller regions: east, mid and west. 
Their study covered the period 1985-2000 and they found no evidence of absolute 
convergence, but signs of conditional convergence within the areas defined as east, mid and 
west. According to them the income gap between the areas remained constant during the 
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 whole period studied. Kanbur and Zhang (2005) have evaluated the underlying reasons for 
inequality among the regions. They found that the pattern of inequality coincided with the 
political policies that encouraged growth.   
 
2.2. Choice of Method 
This is an empirical study based on secondary data. Whether there is a relationship between 
initial gross regional product (GRP) and regional growth rate will be statistically determined 
by using an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model. 
2.3. Data 
The data on the different regional economical indicators used comes from chinadataonline.org 
that is a website set up by the China Data Centre at the University of Michigan. It is 
authorised by the Chinese “National Bureau of Statistics”, which would imply that the data is 
fairly reliable. One should be aware that China is a dictatorship and does have a history of 
exaggerating data in its own favour (Naughton 2007: 70) but the data should give a valid 
approximation of the state of the economy and its development. In this study the data is found 
to be reliable enough since a study of the development of GRP is undertaken instead of 
looking at specific years. Where regional data for certain years has been missing an estimate 
has been calculated by using an average percentage value from the bordering regions.  
The data used for the United States of America to calculate the technological level comes 
from measuringworth.org. Additional data on both China and the US comes from Penn World 
Tables, Barro-Lee’s “International Data on Educational Attainment” and the Chinese Ministry 
of Education. All regressions have been done using Eviews.  
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 3. Background 
Throughout the 20th century Chinese policy makers have had a great deal to say concerning 
the course of the country’s development and regional economics. The growth regressions in 
this study will be based on periods of major political changes. This part of the study is meant 
to give an overview of the political agendas since the 1950’s, the regional privileges and the 
developments within the Chinese society that might have affected the growth rate across the 
country.  
3.1. Policies and Growth in China 
3.1.1. 1952-1978: The Command Economy 
In 1952 China had just underwent a communist revolution (in 1949) when Mao Zedong took 
over power. The socialist system was inspired by the Soviet-model with rapid 
industrialisation by 5-year plans. The first 5-year plan started in 1953 and meant that 
investments grew, especially in the northeast parts of China instead of along the coastline 
where the most developed industry had been located before. Efforts were made to improve 
education and production increased. Collectives in the rural areas were formed, private 
ownership was abolished and by 1956 China was a Soviet-inspired socialist state (Naughton 
2007: 55ff). The system was a command economy and meant that everyone belonged to a 
certain work unit. The people belonging to an urban work unit got higher wages and 
benefitted from better social welfare institutions than those in rural areas (Naughton 
2007:116). The only way to keep the rural population in the low-income agricultural sector 
was by controlling migration. The hukou system – a system where everyone has a residence 
permit connected to a special area (urban or rural) where they are allowed to work and take 
part of the social benefits connected to the area – was introduced in the 1958 to monitor (and 
control) the rate of rural to urban migration (Kjellgren 2000: 105). The hukou system has 
meant that migration within China has virtually been zero during 1960-80. The system still 
exists, but the rate of illegal migration has increased throughout the 1980’s and 90’s to do 
manual labour in the cities, although they get lower wages and are denied the benefits 
connected with an urban status (Naughton 2007: 124).  
The relationship between China and the Soviet Union deteriorated in 1956 when the successor 
of Stalin, Khrushchev, revealed the crimes of Stalinism. This caused a slow-down in the 
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 Chinese rate of change and a short-lived liberal period (known as “the Hundred Flowers”) set 
in to stabilise society and the economy after the political reforms (Spence 1990: 563 ff). The 
period of liberalisation took a u-turn in 1958, when Mao’s obsession with beating the Soviet 
Union’s development path, lead to the initiation of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) (Ljunggren 
2008: 34). The GLF meant that the rate of change towards becoming a socialist economy 
increased. Communes were created in the countryside that functioned as labour pools for 
projects in the area. Monetary compensation for doing a good job was rejected and the 
industry produced goods with advanced technology along with low technology, labour 
intensive goods. Based on false reports and on a very good agricultural year in 1958 the 
government decided to cut down on the resources available for food production and at the 
same time increase the amount of grain that was to be delivered to the state. The amount of 
land allocated to the production of commercial agricultural goods was decreased. The goals 
for industrial production were constantly pushed upwards. The misallocation of resources 
made the GLF a disaster for Chinese society as it resulted in mass starvation and decreased 
production (Naughton 2007: 69 ff).  
The distress that the GLF had resulted in was handled through a policy shift and a crisis 
package in 1961 to increase living standards. A new policy shift came in 1964 where 
industrial investment was heavily developed in the southwestern provinces (mostly for 
strategic reasons to protect the industry from American and Soviet forces). The expanding 
industrial effort was maintained until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution that took place 
during 1966-1976. The Cultural Revolution was a radicalisation of the system started by 
students, but encouraged by Mao who felt threatened by the other members of the communist 
party and wanted a turnaround of policies to strengthen his own power and status as a 
revolutionary leader (Naughton 2007: 75). Once again was the effort to industrialise at the 
expense of agricultural production too great and there was not enough food to support the 
industrial workers. At the end of the era political struggles among Mao’s successors took 
overhand and the development and follow through of new policies was neglected. The 
confusion in the leadership lasted until after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 when reforms 
towards opening up and rehabilitating the economy could finally be discussed. In 1978 Deng 
Xiaoping became the new premier of China and reforms towards a market economy began 
(Naughton 2007: 97ff). 
Even though a lot of questionable policies were introduced under the leadership of Mao, there 
were also positive effects from the socialist system in the welfare of the people. 
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 Improvements of the health system were made and basic education was received by all which 
increased the life expectancy and the literacy rate in the country (Naughton 2007: 82).   
3.1.2. 1978-1999 Liberalisation 
“Let some people get rich first.” 
Deng Xiaoping2
 
During the Mao-era, China’s economy was constantly inferior and inefficient when it came to 
productivity and income. When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 Mao’s brutal 
utopianism was replaced with Deng’s vision to open up to the world. By changing the 
economic policies to more liberal, yet very restricted, views on competition from actors 
outside the state owned sector, Deng hoped that China eventually would catch up with the 
industrialised economies (Ljunggren 1008:39). 
The first major change was made through reforms in the rural areas, where the agricultural 
collectives in some areas could be turned into Town and Village Enterprises (TVE’s). This 
enabled families to run their own farms by renting a piece of land from the collective. This 
had positive impacts on production and on the productivity of labour, since the division of 
labour was now managed within the farm (Naughton 2007: 87). In 1980, China took another 
step towards becoming more compatible with the industrialised economies, by initiating four 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) – Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen - along the 
southeast coastline. In the SEZ’s foreign companies could trade with Chinese enterprises at 
market prices, the Chinese enterprises then sold the foreign goods in the Chinese market at 
government regulated prices (Naughton 2007: 92). Successful results of the SEZ’s, with 
increased international investments, lead to one more SEZ in 1984 – the island Hainan – 
followed by an opening of 14 Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZ) that 
offered similar provisions as the SEZ. In 1990 the last SEZ was opened in eastern Shanghai - 
Pudong (Naughton 2007: 409). 
The SEZ’s and the ETDZ’s were placed along the coast since this was strategic for foreign 
trade. High growth was created in the previously neglected eastern regions, partly due to the 
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 underperformance during the command economy (Naughton 2007: 29). The map below 
(figure 2) displays the location of the SEZ’s and the ETDZ’s.  
 
The reform era is often divided into two periods, where the first one was a dualist system with 
“reform without losers” (Naughton 2007: 97). The government sector still took upon itself to 
have a social responsibility to distribute income and maintain the social welfare system for the 
work units. The dualist system, that had been in place since the communist revolution (with 
differing market regulations, income level and other social welfare indicators for rural and 
urban residents), was upheld until the mid-1990’s. At this time the Chinese government 
adopted a “socialist market economy” and the reform entered its second phase, “the reform 
with losers”. This meant that the previous guarantee of lifetime employment was abolished 
through a downsizing of the state sector (Naughton 2007: 100). At this point the preferential 
treatment that the eastern provinces had enjoyed had given them an advantage over the 
western regions. As the migration regulations loosened, farmers from western China moved to 
the east to work in the cities. The government acknowledged the increasing gap between 
incomes in different regions and began realising that it was time to let all people get rich. 
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 3.1.3. 1999-2007 The Opening of the West 
While the eastern parts of China experienced rapid growth and improved living standards 
after the economic reforms of 1978, the western parts did not experience the same growth 
rate. The Chinese government hoped that the preferential treatment of the eastern regions 
eventually would lead to technological diffusion and growth in the western parts of China 
aswell. However, in the middle of 1990 a statistical analysis showed that growth in the eastern 
parts failed to diffuse to the west (Holbig 2004). In 1999 the Chinese government initiated the 
“Open up the west” campaign to decrease inequality within the country. By making 
adjustments in the regional development policies, Chinese officials hoped to increase the 
political and social stability, encourage endogenous growth and reduce socio-economic 
inequities. This meant that in contrast to the characteristics of the previous years’ low state 
intervention, China now chose to make decisions on a more central level again (Goodman 
2004). The largest part of the Chinese population lives in the eastern regions, and this is 
where most major cities are situated (Naughton 2007: 19). Migrants have been moving to the 
cities during the 1980’s and 90’s and the new policies were meant to reverse the flow of 
migration.  
Even tough there are some positive effects, the outcome of the campaign has not been as 
successful as might have been hoped. This is possibly due to the absence of any organised 
mode of procedure. With numerous of actors on central, regional and local level, the decision 
procedure has been hard to overview and control. Further, the boundaries for western China 
have changed over time. The first definition of western China (which is the one referred to in 
our study) includes the west and central regions, while in year 2000 the central regions 
became more of a developmental bridge between the west and east (Holbig 2004). 
Chinas development towards becoming an open economy took a leap when China in 2001, 
after 15 years of negotiation, entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Along with the 
membership followed several requirements to favour free trade (that earlier had stopped 
China to enter since they could not fulfil them). China had to implement new parts in its legal 
system. Among other changes was the implementation of a law regulating intellectual 
property rights, impartial execution of laws and increased transparency in the process of 
making new laws. China will also remove some of its technical barriers to trade and 
harmonise the technology used to international standards. Other barriers to trade will also be 
decreased (tariffs and quotas on imports) (Nell 2003: 9ff). Today China’s legal system is 
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 broadly compatible with WTO law, which has positive effects on the Chinese economy as 
trade increases, but at the same time competition intensifies which has lowered the profits of 
some state owned enterprises (Nell 2003: 34f). Historically the state owned sector has drained 
the state budget. Although privatisation has taken place there are still some large state owned 
companies left that are not profitable (Kjellgren 2000: 58). 
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 4. Theory 
In order to evaluate the result of the growth policies in China during the time studied, the 
historical polices will be evaluated from a growth perspective. The Solow growth model, 
which is the basic model for understanding economic growth, will be presented along with an 
extension including technology transfer. These models are the basis to the theoretical cause of 
convergence, which will be discussed in the last part of this chapter.  
4.1. Growth Model 
First Solow’s growth model will be introduced, where the fundamental ideas behind 
economic growth will be presented. This will also give an explanation for why countries 
grow at different rates and an idea of how an economy can affect their own growth 
rates. In order to put this information in relation to the Chinese economy an extended 
model with technology transfer will be presented. 
4.1.1. Solow Growth Model 
In the article “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, published 1956, Robert 
Solow introduced his ideas about long run economic growth. The content of this article has 
later been recognised as the Solow growth model and is built around two equations: the 
production function and the capital accumulation function.  
The production function explains how inputs are combined to create output. According to 
Solow, production in a closed economy is dependent on two input variables: physical capital 
(K) and labour (L). In the model only one commodity is produced (Y) and it can either be 
consumed or saved. The production function is expected to have a Cobb-Douglas form and is 
given by equation 1 (Jones 2002: 22): 
Y = Kα L1−α       (equation 1) 
It is assumed that the production function has constant returns to scale, that is, if both L and K 
increases with 10%, Y increases by 10%. Further it is also assumed that capital is subject to 
diminishing returns to scale. Given a fixed stock of labour, the marginal contribution of the 
last unit of capital will be decreasing (ibid). 
The production function can be rewritten in terms of per capita output: 
y = kα      (equation 2) 
Equation 2 implies that production per capita is directly dependent on physical capital per 
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 capita, which leads to the next key equation for this theory that shows how capital 
accumulate: 
K
• = sKY − dK
  The change in physical capital is the difference between savings and the amount of 
depreciation that occurs during the production process. In a closed economy savings (s
  (equation 3) 
KY) 
equals investments and it is assumed that the rate of savings are constant over time. Also the 
rate of depreciation (d) is assumed to be constant over time. Assuming that the growth in the 
labour force ( L
•
/L ) is equal to the growth of the population (n) the capital accumulation 
function can be written in per capita terms: 
k
• = sy − d + n( k)      (equation 4) 
The function shows that high population growth and depreciation tend to decrease the amount 
of capital per person, while savings have a positive impact. At the point when capital per 
capita no longer changes (sY=dK) the economy has reached a steady state condition. By 
combining equation 2 with equation 4 the steady state output per capita (equation 5) can be 
solved and a diagram can be created to display the result. 
y* = s
d + n
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
α
1−α
    (equation 5)
 
y=kα
 
 
(n+d)k 
sy 
 
k 
k* 
y 
Diagram 4.1. The Solow Diagram 
y* 
sy* 
Consumption 
 
Equation 5 predicts that a high savings rate and low population growth leads to high per 
capita output and by looking at the situation in the world today empirical evidence can be find 
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 for this statement (Todaro and Smith 2006: 263). The steady state level differs between 
countries since all countries have different institutional structures, different levels of human 
capital, investment levels etc. When an economy is in its steady state, capital per capita and 
output per capita are constant over time (Jones 2002: 29). Notice that the total output, Y, and 
total amount of capital, K, can still be growing but the growth of the population and the speed 
of depreciation will keep the per capita values constant. If an economy is located below its 
steady state the investments will be higher than the depreciation which will increase the 
capital per capita until the economy reaches its equilibrium at k*. If the investments are too 
low the adjustment will work the other way around. Hence, the economy will always be 
moving towards its steady state.  
According to the simple Solow model there will be no further growth in per capita terms 
when the economy reaches its steady state. Since this assumption has been falsified 
empirically (economies do tend to grow), the model has been extended to include technology 
as a factor that determines long run growth in the steady state. In the long run the economy 
grows along a balanced growth path that is equal to the growth rate of technology.  
  
4.1.2 The Extended Solow-model with Technology Transfer  
Several extensions of the Solow-model have been done where new variables that suggest 
endogenous growth have been introduced. In order to decide which model to use when 
analysing economic growth in the Chinese regions one need to take into account the 
characteristics of the Chinese economy. China is a partly open economy that has had a very 
high growth rate during the past 30 years, which is generally understood as a result of more 
liberal policies and increased investment (Naughton 2007: 145). During the command 
economy China was relatively closed to ideas from abroad, which caused the Chinese 
economy to fall behind in the accumulation of technology. According to Naughton (2007: 
381) one of the reasons for the liberalisation of the economy was a wish to increase Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) that could introduce new technology and hence increase productivity. 
Since technology diffusion seems to have been important for Chinese growth we have chosen 
to use the Solow model with technology transfer to calculate the steady state levels for the 
Chinese economy. This model takes into account how well the economy in question can 
utilise the available world technology. The production function is given by equation 6. 
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 Y= Kα(hL)1-α     (equation 6) 
The same assumptions are made in this model as in the Solow model when it comes to capital 
accumulation, but this one also includes the accumulation of skill:  
h
• = μeψuAγ h1−γ
    (equation 7)
 
Where μ is the economy’s over-all ability to use the existing technology, u is the average time 
spent in school, ψ stands for the quality of the education and γ measures the relative 
importance of technology to human capital. The per capita steady state level is calculated 
using equation 8. 
y* = sK
n + g + d
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
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1−α μ
g
eψu
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
1
γ
A *
   (equation 8)
 
In equation 8 it can be seen that in conformity with the simple Solow model (see equation 5), 
savings have a positive impact on output per capita while population growth and depreciation 
affects it negatively. The second term in the equation explains the importance of human 
capital that enables the third part of the equation (the world technology, A*) to be adapted in 
the economy.  
In order to increase its steady state level, an economy can change its level of human capital 
but not the technology of the world. This is a limitation of the model that makes this model 
suitable for understanding growth in a developing economy, but not in a more developed 
economy that produces its own technology (Jones 2002: 125). 
4.2. Convergence   
The theory of convergence states that economies that have an initially lower GDP per capita 
level will eventually catch up with economies that have an initially higher GDP level 
(Abramovitz 1986). In the Solow model this catch-up effect is due to diminishing returns to 
capital, where economies with initially low levels of capital per worker gain more from 
increasing its capital-labour ratio at the margin than economies with initially higher capital-
labour ratios (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004: 17). In the extended model, the tendencies for 
the economies to converge are caused by the capital-labour ratio, but also by diminishing 
returns to technology. Since imitation is cheaper than innovation the economy will have a 
higher marginal utility of technology the further away from the technological frontier they are 
(Barro et al. 2004: 20). As the amount of un-copied innovations decreases, the cost of 
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 imitations tends to increase and the economy’s rate of growth diminishes (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995: 34). 
The theory of absolute convergence assumes that all economies grow towards the same 
income level, which means that poor countries should have higher growth rates than rich 
countries during the transition path. The theory of absolute convergence among all economies 
does not obtain empirical evidence since it seems as though the richer economies of the world 
are growing faster than the poor economies (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004: 45). However, 
evidence of absolute convergence have been found between economies that exhibit similar 
patterns in the factors affecting their growth rates and thus have about the same steady state 
level, for example the OECD countries (Burda and Wyplosz 2005: 438). In the case of the 
Chinese regions one could expect absolute convergence to be noticeable since regions within 
a country often are more similar than different countries and absolute convergence has been 
found in previous studies at regional level (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991:154). 
A theory that has gained empirical support across samples of countries with diversified 
economies is the theory of conditional convergence. The theory assumes that countries have 
different steady state levels and that they tend to converge towards their own steady state 
level. The differences in steady state levels depend on factors that affect the steady state 
function, such as the savings rate of the economy, the population growth and the 
technological diffusion (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004: 17). Countries that are far away from 
their potential GDP level should, according to the theory of conditional convergence, grow 
faster than those economies closer to their steady state. This theory could explain why 
absolute convergence can be seen among the OECD countries but not across all economies. 
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Figure 2 shows the dynamics of diminishing returns in relation to growth rates. Because of the 
decreasing returns to capital the sy/k-curve will slope downwards. Population growth and 
depreciation is not dependent on k, thus it is plotted as a horizontal line in the diagram. If a 
rich economy has a higher savings rate relative to its capital stock per capita than a poor, the 
rich economy can still have a higher growth rate since they proportionally are further away 
from their steady state (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004:48). This simplified model only shows 
the effect of diminishing returns to capital on the growth rate. In the extended Solow model 
the technological level utilised (determined by the human capital) in the economy has the 
same impact on growth as the savingss rate in figure 2. 
It is possible for countries to move from one steady state level to a higher one through 
changing the composition of the countries production function, for example by increasing 
investment (Jones 2002: 41). In figure 2 this would be depicted as a shift from the spoory/k-
curve to the srichy/k-curve. This would be a one time shift in the steady state level where the 
growth rate would temporarily increase during the transition phase, but as the economy 
reaches its new steady state level the growth rate returns to its original level. According to 
growth theory the only way to increase the steady state growth rate would be to increase the 
technological growth rate, either by expanding the R&D sector, or by increasing the 
efficiency of the sector. In the case of China one could expect the high growth rate to be the 
result of a shift in the level of the steady state (due to the increasing investment rate driven by 
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 increased FDI), but also as an increase in the steady state growth rate since the economy has 
improved its ability to acquire and implement new technology.  
The rate of convergence can be calculated and a further explanation on the empirical 
calculations and results will be given in the next part. 
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 5. Empirical Study 
To check for convergence statistical methods will be used. The regression functions used for 
the various kinds of convergence will be presented in this chapter along with the results for 
convergence in China. 
5.1. Calculating Convergence 
5.1.1. Absolute Convergence of Real GRP and Steady State GRP 
In order to find evidence of absolute convergence a linear regression model is estimated using 
the OLS-method according to the formula: 
 y=a+bx+e                          (equation 9) 
Where initial GRP is the explanatory variable (x) and the growth rate is the dependent 
variable (y). The value of b indicates whether there is a negative relationship between the 
initial GRP level and the growth rate and thus showing evidence of absolute convergence. In 
the calculations Yuan (the Chinese currency) have been used to measure GRP. If b takes on a 
negative value it should be interpreted as a region growing at a growth rate that decreases by 
b per year for every extra Yuan of initial income.  
The same test is run on the steady state values and their growth rate. 
Where absolute convergence is found the number of years it takes for a poor region to 
converge with a richer one can be calculated using equation 10:  
 
T = log GRPR ÷ GRPP( )
log (1+ gP ) ÷ (1+ gR )( )                        (equation 10) 
 
Where the index R stands for the rich region and P for the poor, g is the growth rate.  
 
5.1.2. Conditional Convergence  
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 Conditional convergence means that the regions are moving towards their own steady state 
(calculated using equation 8). The rate at which the GRP is moving towards its steady state is 
calculated using equation 11 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991).  
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This equation shows the log of the real growth rate of the economy, 1
T
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term in the right hand side of the equation, , shows the growth rate of the economy in its 
steady state (which presumably is 0,02 as that is the growth rate of the US. Since we assume 
that the US is in its steady state and is the worlds’ leading technological actor, it is further  
assumed that a country that is in steady state is growing at the same pace as the world 
technology). The term 
xi
*
1
T
log yi
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shows the growth rate of the economy if the economy 
had been growing from its initial income level at time 0 to its steady state income. The term 
1-e-βT show how much of the real growth rate that is determined by the economy’s 
convergence towards its steady state. If there is no convergence towards steady state, i.e. the 
economy is at its steady state level and is growing along a balanced growth path, β will equal 
0, since e0=1 the second term of the equation will disappear and the economy will be growing 
at rate xi*. Nevertheless, the larger the value of βT is, the closer e-βT will be to zero and the 
larger the impact of the growth towards steady state will have for the real growth rate. If e is 
raised to a negative value the indication for the economy is that it is growing at a pace higher 
than the growth rate at steady state, and if e is raised to a positive value the economy is 
growing slower than it would at its steady state.  
In this model the variable that determines the rate of convergence is β. The larger β is, the 
faster the economy is growing towards its steady state. An economy that is close to its steady 
state will have a lower growth rate than an economy far away from its steady state since the 
value of log yi
*
yi,t−T
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠   
will be smaller the closer the economy is to the steady state level. ⎟
When the value of β is known, the time it takes for the economy to close half of the gap 
towards the steady state level can be calculated by setting this expression equal to 0,5. The 
time (T) that it takes is thus: 
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  T = −ln 1− 0,5( )β                                                            (equation 11) 
Using equations 9, 10, 11 and 12 we proceeded by doing the calculations. The half-life of the 
convergence in the cases where the results do not show signs of correlation will not be 
calculated. The results acquired are presented in appendix 4 and interpreted in part 5.2. In part 
6 the results will be analysed in relation to their historical context and the economic 
development in China.  
 
5.2. Results 
The results we got are presented in table 5.1. where they are presented in the order 
China/East/West. Y stands for yes, i.e. convergence can be seen, and N stands for no. 
Where the results were inconclusive it has been denoted by -. The results will be further 
explained in the following text. 
 
Table 5.1.  
 1952-1978 1978-1999 1999-2007 1952-2007 
Absolute 
convergence 
N/N/Y Y/Y/Y N/N/N N/N/N 
Conditional 
convergence 
-/-/- Y/Y/Y -/-/- Y/Y/Y 
Steady state 
convergence 
Y/N/Y Y/Y/Y Y/Y/Y Y/Y/Y 
 
5.2.1. Absolute Convergence  
The results for absolute convergence are presented in appendix 4. For the entire period (1952-
2007) the convergence coefficient is negative, which would imply absolute convergence, but 
this relationship cannot be established at any significance level (the p-value is 18,8%) and the 
coefficient of determination, r2, is low. However, for the sub-period 1978-1999 convergence 
can be found at a 10% significance level but the explanatory rate of the model is still fairly 
low (r2=0,122).  
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 When the data is divided into the eastern and western provinces, convergence cannot be seen 
in any of the areas during the whole time period. During 1978-1999 absolute convergence can 
be found at a 5% significance level in eastern China. During 1952-1978 the relationship 
between initial income and growth is positive which implies divergence across the eastern 
regions but this cannot be established at any significance level.  
In the western provinces convergence can be established at a 1% significance level during 
1952-1978 with a fairly high explanatory rate of the model (r2=0,653). During 1978-1999, 
convergence can be found at a 10% significance level, but with a lower explanatory rate. 
During 1999-2007 there is a positive relationship between the variables, but it is not 
established at any significance level.  
Overall, the period of 1978-1999 shows the strongest signs of absolute convergence. 
However, even though a negative relationship between initial GDP and growth rate can 
sometimes be established the correlation coefficients are generally low, none are higher than -
0,00023, which implies that although there are evidences of absolute convergence during 
certain time periods, the impact that initial GDP has on the growth rate is low.  It would have 
taken 22 years for the poorest region to converge with the richest. But since the economy has 
changed this is no longer valid. 
5.2.2. Conditional Convergence 
Evidence of conditional convergence has been found throughout China for the whole time 
period at a 1% significance level. The rate of conditional convergence towards the regions 
individual steady states is 0,49% per year in China, and at 0,53% in eastern China and 0,41% 
per year in western China. The r2 values are relatively high for China and eastern China, but 
lower for western China. Evidence of conditional convergence can also be found at a 1% 
significance level in China during the time period 1978-99, where the growth rate towards 
steady state is 1,36% per year. The regions in eastern China show conditional convergence at 
a rate of 1,58% per year during this period. During the period 1999-2007 western China was 
found to have experienced conditional convergence of 0,90% per year at a 1% significance 
level.  
Although conditional convergence seems to have occurred, the results were ambiguous as 
certain periods showed negative β-values, which indicate divergence from the regions steady 
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 states. The regressions also show negative r2 values. These indicate that the model is not 
suitable in order to explain the studied phenomenon for these periods. When using e-views a 
negative r2 value indicates that the regression has a worse fit than a model only consisting of 
the sample mean would have (Eviews). This occurs due to the fixed intercept at 0,02 (2% 
growth in steady state).  
5.2.3. Convergence of Regional Steady State Levels 
Convergence was found among the regions steady state levels during all time periods except 
for 1952-1978 in eastern China where the correlation coefficient turned out to be non-
significant at a 10% level. The model seems to be a pretty good fit as the r2-values are 
generally relatively high. The impact the initial steady state level has on the growth rate of the 
steady state is thus significant, but rather low as the correlation coefficients show low values.  
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 6. Analysis  
In this section the empirical results will be discussed and compared to the growth policies in 
China. The analysis is divided in three parts where absolute convergence, conditional 
convergence and steady state convergence will be considered. The underlying factors of 
convergence, or the lack of convergence, will be discussed. 
6.1. Absolute Convergence 
The reason for studying absolute convergence is that absolute convergence leads to a 
decreased gap between the regions. However, even if the gap decreases in percentage points, 
the absolute gap in monetary terms may still increase which leads to increased income 
inequality. For example, if two regions grow by 5% each and one region has initial income of 
100 Yuan and the other 1000 Yuan, the second economy will grow more in monetary terms 
although they have the same percentage growth. If absolute convergence does exist the 
inequalities will eventually disappear, but if the convergence happens at a low pace people 
may not notice the improved equality in the short run. 
In our study we found that the Chinese regions have not experienced absolute convergence 
through the period 1952-2007. This result differs from the results of Barro and Sala-i-Martins 
results from the US and European regions where convergence was found at a 2% rate per 
year. The difference is interesting as one might expect a similar result and the question arises: 
Why are the Chinese regions not converging? One explanation could be that although we are 
looking at fairly long time span the political policies in China have gone through radical 
changes throughout the period (the great leap forward, the cultural revolution, the reforms in 
’78, becoming a socialist market economy etc.) which, for example the US, has not.  
According to the theory of convergence the underlying reasons for converging are that the 
economies are homogenous in the factors affecting the production function. In China these 
factors have differed across the regions, for example the savings rate has been very unequal, 
the technological levels have been different and the years in education have been higher in 
eastern China. The assumption that regions within a country should be similar may not be true 
for China.  
Since the regions show different production abilities their steady state levels should be 
different, hence it is not surprising to see that the result differ from that in the US or Europe 
where the regions are more homogenous. Also, Barro and Sala-i-Martin point to migration as 
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 a factor speeding up the rate of convergence. In the US and Europe migration can help 
equalise income since labour can move from areas with low demand to areas with high 
demand for labour with higher wages. In China the hukou system has made it close to 
impossible for people to migrate from poor regions with low wages to richer regions. This has 
upheld the differences in wages and living standards across the regions, which has slowed 
down convergence. Also, the lack of population movement has inhibited the spread of 
technology, and thus the western regions have not been able to implement the new technology 
that the eastern regions have acquired from abroad. In the past decade the authorities have not 
had as strict control over migration within China as they previously had and illegal migrants 
have come from the rural areas to the urban areas in search for work. Although the migrants 
are usually employed as manual labour the diffusion of both income and technology could 
increase further in the future. Even today remittances from family members working in the 
cities are sent back to the countryside, which decreases the income gap slightly. 
The only period in time where evidence of absolute convergence could be seen across the 
Chinese regions was between 1978 and 1999. The evidence for absolute convergence was not 
that strong and the poorer regions only increased their growth rate by 0,00275% per Yuan. 
Diagram 6.1. Absolute convergence in China 1978-199
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In diagram 6.1., three of the regions show a much higher initial GRP. To check our result 
we removed these observations, but we received a similar result. 
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 This correlation was stronger in the eastern regions than in the western, but the correlation 
coefficient was lower in the east than in the west. The reason for the convergence during this 
period can probably be related to the overall increase in GDP that was driven by increased 
investments after the reform. The reform created incentives for investment both in fixed 
capital and human capital, hence the investment rate increased throughout China and the 
average years of education increased in every region. Although the engine behind the growth 
lay in the eastern regions, the western regions also increased growth and investment, and due 
to decreasing returns to scale the initially poorer regions could benefit more, which would 
explain the signs of convergence.  
The strongest result for absolute convergence was found in the western regions during 1952-
1978 where the poorer regions grew at a rate that was 0,023% higher per Yuan less of initial 
income. This is probably due to the increased investments in this area in combination with 
decreasing returns to capital. 
6.2. Conditional Convergence 
The evidence for absolute convergence was weak so there are no clear evidence that the 
different policies have made the regions move towards a common steady state. Further, 
convergence of the regions towards their own steady states have been calculated, based on the 
regions’ individual savings rate, educational effort, population growth and openness. This is 
investigated to establish whether the regions that are further away from their steady states 
grow faster than the regions that are close to their steady states, at which rate they are 
converging on average, and how long it takes for the regions to reduce the gap to the steady 
state by half.  
The results for conditional convergence are interesting as a result of existing conditional 
convergence can help to determine future policies (if they affect the level of the steady state 
they will also affect the real GRP since these would be interlinked). The results show that 
conditional convergence can be seen across China during 1952-2007. The average rate of 
convergence towards the steady state in China is 0,49% per year during this period. At this 
rate it would take 140 years for half of the gap between the present GRP level and the steady 
state level to close. This result is below the results found in various studies of industrialised 
countries, for example in the US by Barro and Sala-i-Martin that found a conditional 
convergence rate of 2% per year. This could be caused by the rate of change in China during 
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 the time looked at. The steady state levels in China have grown at an exponential rate from 
1952 to 2007. As can be seen in diagram 6.2., the average GRP per capita is “chasing” the 
steady state level, but the high rate of increase in steady state makes it almost impossible for 
the real GRP to catch up. Even if the economy has reached and outperformed it 1952 steady 
state level in 2007 the new steady state levels of 2007 are still above the real GRP.  
Diagram 6.2. GRP per capita in China
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The exponential pattern of the Chinese steady state growth can be contrasted to that of the 
United States that has followed a linear pattern during the same period.  
Diagram 6.3. USA's GDP per capita
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 The predictability of the American GDP level has probably caused the convergence to be as 
strong as it is (2%) while the unpredictability of the Chinese economy could be a reason for 
the weak signs of convergence. To illustrate this further diagram 6.4. will show the growth 
rate of the steady state levels for China and for the US where it can be seen that the growth 
rate in China is fluctuating a lot more than that in the US.  
Diagram 6.4. Steady state growth
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In the results different rates of convergence in eastern and western China was found and also 
different values for different time periods. In eastern China the rate of convergence was at 
1,58% per year during 1978-1999, and 0,46% per year during 1952-2007. At these rates it 
would take approximately 44 years respectively 130 years for 50% of the gap to close. The 
reason for the convergence during 1978-1999 could be that the eastern regions, according to 
Naughton (2007), underperformed during the command economy and could exploit its 
potential after the 1978 reform, which meant that they could keep up its real growth rate with 
the high steady state growth. The signs of convergence during 1952-2007 indicate that the 
eastern GRP is growing towards its steady state but at a slow rate. The reason for the lack of 
convergence during 1952-78 could be due to the often negative growth rate in the steady state 
level, while real GRP did not fluctuate as much. The puzzling results received between 1999-
2007 could be caused by the very rapid increase in the steady state level (16% per year), while 
the GRP level has grown at a high rate (13% per year), but still lower than the steady state? 
We think that eastern China is still in a transitional phase, moving from a low GRP level to a 
higher, and if we had had a longer time span to look at we might have seen a levelling out of 
the increase in steady state in the future, followed by a levelling out in GRP.  
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 Western China shows conditional convergence during 1978-1999. The lack of convergence 
during 1999-2007 could be due to the very high steady state growth rate. Although a trend 
shift can be seen around year 2000 where the rate of growth increased, seen in diagram 6.4. In 
the diagram it looks as though the western parts have just begun its growth toward a higher 
income level. While eastern China has moved further along its transition path.  
Diagram 6.5. GRP 
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6.3. Steady State Convergence 
Conditional convergence was found and we want to know if this will eventually lead to 
absolute convergence. Since the steady state level is a theoretical potential level for what GRP 
could be when the present amount of resources are utilised efficiently, the steady state GRP is 
affected at an earlier stage by changes in production inputs than real GRP. In reality there are 
time lags present that delay the effects of the changed circumstances for the real GRP. For 
example, if there is a high rate of investment it might take a while for the investments to pay 
off, thus the potential GRP is higher than the real GRP at the present date.  
Evidence for steady state convergence was found, which implies that the GRP levels will 
eventually have the same steady state level. Since conditional convergence was found, real 
GRP will eventually converge. This, however, will take a long time since the correlation 
coefficients for initial steady state GRP and steady state growth rates are low.  
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 A higher convergence rate was found among the western regions steady state levels than 
among the eastern, but since the results showed convergence among all the regions the 
western and eastern steady state levels will eventually converge. Diagram 6.5. illustrates the 
development of steady state levels among the eastern and western regions and as can be seen 
the western regions show a similar growth path as the eastern, but the western regions have 
begun growing at a later date than the eastern. If we assume that the Chinese regions cannot 
maintain a 13% growth rate infinitely, the growth rates would eventually level out and move 
along a balanced growth path (where growth is approximately the same as the technological 
growth). Since there is steady state convergence and the west and east show similar growth 
patterns (but with a time lag for the west) they will probably level out at a similar new steady 
state level. 
 
Diagram 6.6. Steady state
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 7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate if there are any results for convergence across the 
Chinese regions. In contrast to the results found by Barro and Sala-i-Martin in the US and 
Europe, the evidence for convergence in China seem to be weaker and, when found, at a 
lower convergence rate. The results for China showed absolute convergence during 1978-
1999, and for western China during 1952-1978 as well, but not over the entire period, and not 
in the most recent period of investigation. Correlation could be seen between the political 
policies in the areas and during the times where convergence was present. Absolute 
convergence in China seems to have occurred when investment has been targeted in specific 
areas and diffused to bordering regions. Western China received investments during 1952-
1978, but not enough to affect the whole economy. The reforms in 1978 affected the Chinese 
society thoroughly since it put China on a course towards a socialist market economy. The 
increasing investments made in China and the increasing foreign trade affected not only the 
eastern parts but also diffused to the western regions, but with less impact. This does not have 
to mean that the regions are not moving towards a common income level. Evidence of 
conditional convergence and steady state convergence were found, which indicates that the 
Chinese regions will eventually reach the same GRP levels. The inequalities between the 
regions will decrease in the long run.  
China is in a transitional phase between a lower and a higher income level. Due to this it is 
hard to recognise what parts of the growth rate that is caused by a level shift and what is 
caused by convergence. Also, the high rate of increase in the steady state level complicates 
the regional convergence towards steady state.  
The Chinese regions are still growing rapidly, even the richer ones. This could be caused by 
the fact that all regions still have growth potential left since the income level is below that of 
the developed countries. The Chinese society can still implement already existing technology 
and thus increase the efficiency in the economy. Efficiency has been increased through 
privatisations, but there are still state owned companies left that use the same production 
methods as during the command economy. China also has a large labour pool of workers in 
the rural areas that could be utilised in the urban areas more efficiently. 
The restrictions on migration could also have had effects on the lack of income and 
technology equalising. Migration is a means of spreading labour to where it is demanded, and 
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 ideas will be transferred as people migrate. The diffusion of technology is also hindered by 
the lower rate of openness and infrastructure in the western areas. Since the beginning of the 
“open up the west” reform investment in infrastructure has increased in the west, but it takes 
time before this shows effects on the real GRP. The rate of openness should also have 
increased since they joined the WTO. The increasing growth rate from 1999 could be an 
effect of the increasing effort to transfer technology. 
The preferential treatment experienced by the western provinces since 1999 might have 
lacked in impact as the policies do not give the western regions an advantage in relation to the 
eastern, it only levels out the playing field.  
The study has considered inequality between regions, but not within regions. It has not shown 
the development in equality in real monetary terms, but as a percentage growth rate. For 
future research other measure of inequality could be investigated, for example regional gini-
coefficients. To check for the inequalities in real income one could also look at how the 
income gap between the poorest regions and the richest ones has developed over time. 
In conclusion, the evidence for convergence has not been very strong. This does not have to 
have negative effects on the Chinese economy as the convergence theory might not be the 
best one when dealing with inequality in transitional economies. However, all regions in 
China are growing at a high rate, and the western regions show the same growth pattern as the 
eastern but with a time lag. This means that even though the regions are not converging the 
polarisation is not increasing. The rich are getting richer, but so are the poor. 
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 APPENDIX 1 
Calculating the technological level, A. 
It is assumed that the United States of America is the most advanced country technologically 
and that the country is in its steady state. In order to calculate a value for A one needs to look 
at how much of the US GDP that cannot be attributed to the other factors in the production 
function with technological transfer. For the US the model with technological transfer might 
not be the most optimal model since it is better suited to explain growth in developing 
countries, but since this is the model used throughout the study it is used here as well to get a 
suitable value for A.  
The value of A is calculated according to the formula: 
 A* = y *
sK
n + g + d
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
α
1−α μ
g
eψu
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
1
γ  
Where the following set values have been used: 
 g= 0,02 ( =(US GDP2007-US GDP1952)^(1/55)-1) 
 d= 0,05 
 ψ= 0,1 
 μ= 0,2 
 γ= 0,5  
 α= 1/3 
 
The remaining data have been gathered and calculated from Measuringworth, Penn World 
tables and Barro-Lee and gives the following values: 
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Year Technological 
level (A) 
Year Technological 
level (A) 
Year Technological 
level (A) 
1952 7,794 1971 7,813 1990 7,552 
1953 7,842 1972 7,824 1991 7,798 
1954 7,688 1973 7,902 1992 7,699 
1955 7,576 1974 7,815 1993 7,618 
1956 7,598 1975 8,284 1994 7,503 
1957 7,754 1976 7,634 1995 7,515 
1958 7,535 1977 7,045 1996 7,584 
1959 7,547 1978 6,604 1997 7,63 
1960 7,717 1979 6,187 1998 7,742 
1961 7,527 1980 5,895 1999 7,886 
1962 7,519 1981 5,92 2000 7,944 
1963 7,433 1982 6,141 2001 8,108 
1964 7,48 1983 6,338 2002 8,21 
1965 7,408 1984 6,298 2003 8,249 
1966 7,533 1985 6,691 2004 8,043 
1967 7,696 1986 6,896 2005 8,392 
1968 7,796 1987 6,989 2006 8,517 
1969 7,699 1988 7,214 2007 8,565 
1970 7,874 1989 7,287   
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 APPENDIX 2 
Calculating u 
Data over average years in school in China was available from Barro-Lee for the years 1974-
2004. Looking at data from Ljunggren and the Ministry of Education in China the average for 
the remaining years was approximated.   
To calculate the number of years in education for each province regional statistics was looked 
at (from chinadataonline) of school enrolment and the percentage of students entering 
secondary school after graduating from primary. By comparing each regions value with a 
calculated average and then multiplying the quota with the average years in school in China a 
regional average could be determined.  
uR = PRPC
× SR
SC
× uC
                       (equation A1)
 
Where uR denotes the regional average years of education, P the percentage entering primary 
school, S the percentage entering secondary school. The index R denotes the regional value 
and the C the average value in China.  
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 APPENDIX 3 
Determining μ 
μ is a value used to measure the economy’s ability to utilise the world technology. It takes on 
a value greater than 0 and its value is arbitrarily chosen to make the value of the technological 
level (also chosen at one’s own discretion) fit in the production function, hence, A and μ 
together determine the level of technology that is used in the economy’s production. In order 
to find an appropriate value for μ one must take into consideration how efficiently the 
economy can make use of the world technology. This depends on factors such as 
infrastructure, migration and openness.  
In this study measures of openness have been used to approximate μ. The values of openness 
have been gathered from Penn World Tables where country level data is available. In Penn 
Word Tables openness has been calculated by dividing the value of imports and exports by 
the gross domestic product (GDP). To find regional values for openness the values of exports 
and imports per region in relation to GRP have been looked at and compared to the average 
value of the trade/GRP quota in China. This value has been multiplied by the Penn World 
Tables openness value in China to find regional values for openness. In order to get a value 
for openness that is comparable to the μ-value of the United States (set at 0,2) the Chinese 
openness index to has been adjusted to be proportional to that of the US, hence the formula 
used to calculate regional openness can be written as follows: 
 xR = PChinaPUSA
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ μUSA
R
R∑( )/N
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟  
Where xR = regional openness, P= value of openness from Penn World tables, R=the regional 
export+import/GRP value, N= number of regions in China and μUSA is the value set for ability 
to utilise technology in the US used when calculating the world technological level (A). 
The values for openness calculated have been used as estimates of how prone the regions are 
in relation to each other to utilise existing technology. However, using the value for openness 
as an approximation for μ seems to be misleading as μ includes more variables. In order not to 
overestimate the importance of openness the value of openness has been used to indicate the 
 42
 relative values of μ between the regions, but the scale has been adjusted so that the resulting 
steady state values become somewhat more realistic. The model used for adjusting openness 
to μ looks as follows: 
μR = (0,02xR )0,3
 
The results from this transformation is that the lower values for μ increase and the higher 
decrease. Multiplying by a constant is meant to adjust for the importance of openness when 
measuring μ. Raising openness to a constant smaller than 1 is meant to represent diminishing 
rates of return for openness in relation to technological utilisation. This seems realistic as 
there might have been an overrepresentation of openness in relation to technology transfer 
into China in recent years, as the economy’s capacity to utilise new technology may have 
reached bottle necks in other areas (for example, the infrastructures ability to spread 
technology, or the richer the regions get there might not be such a big surplus of unutilised 
technology left so that increased openness has a substantial effect on the technology entering 
the economy). In line with the same reasoning it is also assumed that there is a risk of 
underestimating μ if only openness is considered during the command economy. Technology 
can diffuse into an economy by other means than trade. The diagram below shows the effect 
of the adjustment on the openness values for Beijing: 
 
Diagram A1.  μ, Beijing
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 APPENDIX 4 
1.3.1 Results for absolute convergence 
Period and 
area 
Correlation-
coefficient 
p-value R2-value Time to 
convergence 
between the 
poorest and 
richest 
region 
China 1952-
2007 
-0,00002254 
(0,0000167) 
0,188 0,0658  
1952-1978 0,00000552 
(0,0000287) 0,849 
0,00142  
1978-1999 -0,00001342 
(0,00000707) 0,0687*** 
0,122 312 
1999-2007 -0,00000205 
(0,00000289) 
0,485 0,0190   
East 1952-2007 -0,00003330 
(0,0000203) 
0,121 0,143  
1952-1978 0,00003661 
(0,0000305) 
0,247 0,0828  
1978-1999 -0,00001893 
(0,00000693) 
0,0148** 0,318  
1999-2007 -0,00000099 
(0,00000285) 
0,734 0,00743  
West 1952-
2007 
-0,00004904 
(0,0000289) 
0,129 0,264  
1952-1978 -0,00022955 
(0,0000592) 
0,0047* 0,653  
1978-1999 -0,00009401 
(0,0000445) 
0,0677*** 0,358  
1999-2007 0,00002657 
(0,0000348) 
0,5549 0,0680  
 
* significant at a 1% level 
** significant at a 5% level 
***significant at a 10% level 
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1.3.2 Results for conditional convergence 
Period and 
area 
Correlation-
coefficient 
p-value R2-value β-value Years to 
half-life 
China 1952-
2007 
0,2372 
(0,0130) 
0,0000* 0,418 0,00492 140 
1952-1978 0,0355 
(0,0451) 
0,439 -0,152 0,00139  
1978-1999 0,2477 
(0,0120) 
0,0000* 0,452 0,01355 51 
1999-2007 0,3140 
(0,0150) 
0,0000* -0,1626 0,04711  
East 1952-
2007 
0,2539 
(0,0169) 
0,0000* 0,4673 0,00533 130 
1952-1978 -0,0357 
(0,0531) 
0,5104 -0,1361 -0,00135  
1978-1999 0,2829 
(0,0230) 
0,0000* 0,5435 0,01584 44 
1999-2007 0,3079 
(0,0151) 
0,0000* -0,03228 0,04600  
West 1952-
2007 
0,2037 
(0,0162) 
0,0000* 0,2317 0,004141 167 
1952-1978 -0,03503 
(0,0873) 
0,6977 -017997 -0,001324  
1978-1999 0,1717 
(0,0261) 
0,0001* 0,3394 0,008970 77 
1999-2007 0,3243 
(0,0325) 
0,0000* -0,3627 0,04900  
 
* significant at a 1% level 
** significant at a 5% level 
***significant at a 10% level 
 
1.3.3 Results for steady state convergence 
Period and 
area 
Correlation-
coefficient 
p-value R2-value Time to 
convergence 
between the 
poorest and 
richest 
region 
China 1952-
2007 
-0,0000255 
(0,00000562) 
0.0031* 0.442 75 
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 1952-1978 -0,0000402 
(0,000012) 
0.0204* 0.302 58 
1978-1999 -0,0000222 
(0,0000222) 
0.0412** 0.151 64 
1999-2007 -0,00000446 
(0,0000124) 
0.0013* 0.333 54 
East 1952-2007 -0,0000199 
(0,00000628) 
0.0060* 0.385 63 
1952-1978 -0,0000202 
(0,0000202) 
0.1307 0.137  
1978-1999 -0,0000214 
(0,0000116) 
0.0834*** 0.176 64 
1999-2007 -0,00000535 
(0,00000126) 
0.0006* 0.530 21 
West 1952-
2007 
-0,0000395 
(0,0000131) 
0.0164** 0.534 61 
1952-1978 -0,0000833 
(0,0000228) 
0.0064* 0.627 106 
1978-1999 -0,0000879 
(0,0000244) 
0.0069* 0.619 30 
1999-2007 -0,0000170 
(0,00000836) 
0.0764*** 0.341 22 
 
* significant at a 1% level 
** significant at a 5% level 
***significant at a 10% level 
 
The residuals have been tested in all regressions to test for the accuracy of the results (if the 
estimator is the best linear unbiased estimate, BLUE). In two cases (absolute convergence 
China 1999-2007 and conditional convergence China 1999-2007) it was found, using a 
Jarque-Berra test, that the residuals were not normally distributed, hence inference based on 
the results are not reliable (Westerlund 2005: 134). In two cases (absolute convergence west 
1999-2007 and steady state convergence China 1952-1978) heteroscedasticity was found 
using a White’s test. This means that the estimators are no longer the most efficient since they 
don’t have the lowest variance (Westerlund 2005: 96). The heteroscedasticity has been 
adjusted for  by using White’s variance-covariance matrix to get valid interference.   
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 APPENDIX 5 
The Chinese provinces included in the study: 
East   
Name (pinyin) Chinese name3 Status 
Anhui 安徽 Province 
Beijing 北京 Municipality 
Fujian 福建 Province 
Guangdong 广东 Province 
Hebei 河北 Province 
Heilongjiang 黑龙江 Province 
Henan 河南 Province 
Hubei 湖北 Province 
Hunan 湖南 Province 
Jiangsu 江苏 Province 
Jiangxi 江西 Province  
Jilin 吉林 Province 
Liaoning 辽宁 Province 
Shandong 山东 Province 
Shanghai 上海 Municipality 
Shanxi 山西 Province 
Tianjin 天津 Municipality 
Zhejiang 浙江 Province 
 
West   
Name (pinyin) Chinese name Status 
Gansu 甘肃 Province 
Guangxi 广西 Autonomous Region  
Guizhou 贵州 Province 
Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia)                 内蒙古 Autonomous Region  
Ningxia 宁夏 Autonomous Region  
Qinghai 青海 Province 
Shaanxi 陕西 Province 
Sichuan 四川 Province 
Xinjiang 新疆 Autonomous Region  
Yunnan 云南 Province 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Source: Kjellgren 2000 
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 APPENDIX 6 
Regional GRP (1978 price level) 
Region 1952 1978 1999 2007 
East     
Beijing 193 1290 4215 13107 
Tianjin 331 1160 4592 13776 
Shanghai 460 2498 7625 17188 
Hebei 123 364 2020 5344 
Shanxi 120 365 1312 4536 
Liaoning 275 680 2741 6879 
Jilin 204 381 1673 4739 
Heilongjiang 306 564 1877 4246 
Jiangsu 150 430 2781 8688 
Zhejiang 114 331 2894 8691 
Anhui 78 244 1324 3173 
Fujian 121 273 2684 6299 
Jiangxi 125 276 1256 3201 
Shandong 102 316 2725 8304 
Henan 103 232 1619 4735 
Hubei 111 332 1719 4009 
Hunan 112 286 1163 3003 
Guangdong 112 369 2810 7439 
West     
Guangxi 75 225 991 2867 
Xinjiang 154 313 1598 4007 
Ningxia 147 370 1174 3690 
Qinghai 78 428 1119 3093 
Gansu 122 348 1002 2681 
Shaanxi 98 291 1023 3442 
Yunnan 64 226 1150 2622 
Guizhou 76 175 639 1708 
Sichuan 66 262 1102 2915 
Inner Mongolia 231 317 1469 6510 
 
Average GRP 
 1952 1978 1999 2007 
China 152 477 2082 5746 
East 174 577 2613 7075 
West 111 296 1127 3354 
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 APPENDIX 7 
 
Regional Growth Rates 
Region 1952-2007 1952-1978 1978-1999 1999-2007 
East     
Beijing 0,0797 0,0758 0,0580 0,1524 
Tianjin 0,0701 0,0494 0,0677 0,1472 
Shanghai 0,0681 0,0673 0,0546 0,1069 
Hebei 0,0709 0,0425 0,0850 0,1293 
Shanxi 0,0683 0,0437 0,0628 0,1678 
Liaoning 0,0603 0,0355 0,0686 0,1219 
Jilin 0,0589 0,0243 0,0730 0,1390 
Heilongjiang 0,0490 0,0238 0,0589 0,1074 
Jiangsu 0,0765 0,0412 0,0930 0,1530 
Zhejiang 0,0820 0,0418 0,1088 0,1473 
Anhui 0,0697 0,0449 0,0839 0,1155 
Fujian 0,0746 0,0319 0,1150 0,1125 
Jiangxi 0,0607 0,0308 0,0748 0,1241 
Shandong 0,0834 0,0446 0,1080 0,1494 
Henan 0,0721 0,0317 0,0969 0,1436 
Hubei 0,0675 0,0432 0,0814 0,1117 
Hunan 0,0616 0,0367 0,0691 0,1259 
Guangdong 0,0793 0,0470 0,1015 0,1294 
West     
Guangxi 0,0684 0,0430 0,0731 0,1420 
Xinjiang 0,0611 0,0277 0,0807 0,1218 
Ningxia 0,0604 0,0363 0,0565 0,1539 
Qinghai 0,0692 0,0676 0,0468 0,1356 
Gansu 0,0578 0,0411 0,0516 0,1309 
Shaanxi 0,0669 0,0428 0,0617 0,1637 
Yunnan 0,0698 0,0497 0,0805 0,1085 
Guizhou 0,0583 0,0328 0,0636 0,1308 
Sichuan 0,0713 0,0545 0,0708 0,1293 
Inner Mongolia 0,0626 0,0123 0,0758 0,2045 
 
 
 Average regional growth rates 
 1952-2007 1951-78 1978-99 1999-2007 
China 0,0678 0,0416 0,0758 0,1359 
East 0,0696 0,0420 0,0812 0,1325 
West 0,0646 0,0408 0,0661 0,1421 
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 APPENDIX 8 
Regional Steady State GRP (1978 price level) 
Region 1952 1978 1999 2007 
East     
Beijing 151 1002 10569 39097 
Tianjin 2647 2466 12803 39984 
Shanghai 961 1603 17378 38539 
Hebei 291 669 3806 9806 
Shanxi 192 129 2927 10379 
Liaoning 1414 1195 6345 22252 
Jilin 357 331 3910 12121 
Heilongjiang 812 196 2501 10393 
Jiangsu 187 610 10105 34888 
Zhejiang 73 336 7934 25111 
Anhui 157 86 2761 13611 
Fujian 660 1408 8794 22540 
Jiangxi 310 277 2145 10398 
Shandong 408 1323 7610 24536 
Henan 101 359 1698 6466 
Hubei 1113 574 2574 9811 
Hunan 553 435 2214 6918 
Guangdong 652 1400 17988 29513 
West     
Guangxi 190 805 2877 8228 
Xinjiang 1609 463 4705 15243 
Ningxia 340 979 4969 10800 
Qinghai 107 546 2143 6283 
Gansu 42 286 1992 10004 
Shaanxi 132 174 2414 8345 
Yunnan 46 591 2753 9476 
Guizhou 20 259 1930 5903 
Sichuan 13 126 2625 9180 
Inner Mongolia 329 253 3502 9488 
 
Average Steady State GRP 
 1952 1978 1999 2007 
China 495 674 5499 16404 
East 613 800 6892 20353 
West 283 448 2991 9295 
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 APPENDIX 9 
 
Regional Steady State Growth Rates 
Region 1952-2007 1952-1978 1978-1999 1999-2007 
East     
Beijing 0,1064 0,0756 0,1187 0,1776 
Tianjin 0,0506 -0,0027 0,0816 0,1530 
Shanghai 0,0694 0,0199 0,1202 0,1047 
Hebei 0,0660 0,0325 0,0863 0,1256 
Shanxi 0,0753 -0,0150 0,1601 0,1714 
Liaoning 0,0514 -0,0064 0,0827 0,1698 
Jilin 0,0662 -0,0028 0,1247 0,1519 
Heilongjiang 0,0474 -0,0532 0,1288 0,1949 
Jiangsu 0,0997 0,0465 0,1430 0,1675 
Zhejiang 0,1120 0,0604 0,1624 0,1549 
Anhui 0,0845 -0,0231 0,1798 0,2207 
Fujian 0,0663 0,0296 0,0912 0,1249 
Jiangxi 0,0660 -0,0043 0,1024 0,2181 
Shandong 0,0773 0,0463 0,0869 0,1576 
Henan 0,0785 0,0499 0,0767 0,1820 
Hubei 0,0404 -0,0252 0,0741 0,1821 
Hunan 0,0470 -0,0092 0,0806 0,1530 
Guangdong 0,0718 0,0298 0,1293 0,0638 
West     
Guangxi 0,0710 0,0572 0,0625 0,1404 
Xinjiang 0,0417 -0,0467 0,1167 0,1583 
Ningxia 0,0649 0,0415 0,0804 0,1019 
Qinghai 0,0768 0,0646 0,0673 0,1439 
Gansu 0,1046 0,0765 0,0969 0,2235 
Shaanxi 0,0783 0,0108 0,1333 0,1677 
Yunnan 0,1019 0,1036 0,0760 0,1671 
Guizhou 0,1088 0,1034 0,1003 0,1500 
Sichuan 0,1273 0,0928 0,1554 0,1694 
Inner Mongolia 0,0630 -0,0100 0,1332 0,1327 
 
 
 Average Steady State Growth Rates 
 1952-2007 1951-78 1978-99 1999-2007 
China 0,0755 0,0265 0,1090 0,1582 
East 0,0709 0,0138 0,1128 0,1596 
West 0,0838 0,0494 0,1022 0,1555 
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